Phishing and adversary-in-the-middle attacks
Fake emails and links lure users to fake sign-in pages. A relay server can sit between the user and the real service, forwarding IDs, passwords and even MFA steps to the legitimate service.
See the attack flow & countermeasures
Once sign-in succeeds on the real service, the attacker can capture the resulting session cookie or token and reuse the already-authenticated state.
Even with MFA in place, some methods remain vulnerable to relay phishing, and an authenticated session can be hijacked.
- Move admins and key users to passkeys / FIDO2
- Disable legacy authentication
- Apply Conditional Access
- Require compliant or managed devices
- Monitor suspicious sign-ins and sessions
- Prepare session-revocation procedures
Public information cannot reveal the contents of emails or sign-in pages. Only some basics, such as HTTPS and HSTS presence, can be checked.
The MFA method, Conditional Access, session protection and adoption of phishing-resistant authentication cannot be checked.
Note Do not assume FIDO2 alone stops every attack. A compromised device, or session theft after sign-in, requires additional defenses.